# Off

## Queer negativity

#### Their emphasis on becoming can only ever lead to assimilation into capital—queerness as becoming negates the very negativity of queerness

baedan 12 (baedan, 2012, “baedan,” authors’ manuscript, baedan — journal of queer nihilism — issue one; <http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/baedan-musings-on-nothingness>) **modified for abliest language**

In other words, the demand of the economy is no longer that one simply conform or adapt, but even more that one takes upon oneself a dedication to the labor of becoming flexible, that one ~~see~~ it not as simply the necessary submission to a pressure exerted from outside but instead to act as if it would be ideal to no longer even be able to feel any externally-imposed force as such. To believe in oneself as the agent[18] of one’s own life, but to ~~see~~ [understand] oneself thus also as the agent of the control[19] of the same. In this world, the static individual is the sorry loser, the irrelevant nobody because the tides shift so rapidly that it is no longer a matter of steadfastly weathering the storm nor of hurrying to keep up with the latest fashions and trends, but in actuality a spiritual, metaphysical discipline of becoming so flexible as to become the waves themselves and be washed peacefully in the sea of society. Whenever the postmodernist speaks of becoming, not being, we must ask, “becoming what?” For, if postmodernity was birthed in the revolt of May ‘68, its maturation has been under the decades of punishment for such a transgression. And the answer will always be, in the end, becoming capital. The challenge is not to make a staunch appeal to the past forms of life but to critique those that arise today, to refuse to presuppose their awesomeness simply from their newness. In becoming there is always a gap between being-this and being-that. The affirmation of becoming as more fundamental than being (a la “nothing is static, that is mere myth; the essence cannot be frozen because everything is always mutable, so a thing is never itself and a being cannot identify since it will become other in the process; so becoming is primary and being is mere reduction to falsity…”), however, fills this space positively, or at least tries to incorporate an existential negativity[20] into the realm of the symbolic order, logical systems, and the functioning of the existent (which is no longer really the existent, but instead the scope of all becomings), negating its negativity by positing it as axiomatic[21] to the order of things (rather than as excluded as by the old logic-systems and ontologies), which are no longer understood as things nor necessarily ordered, but it would be absurd to expect this chiasmic flux to be anarchic when in fact it is founded upon the attempted incorporation of an ontological negativity into a system of ontological subjectivity.[22]

#### The only alternative is to annihilate every trace of this world, in every instance.

baedan 12 (baedan, 2012, “baedan,” authors’ manuscript, baedan — journal of queer nihilism — issue one; http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/baedan-baedan)

Again, a simple shift can apply this argument to the discursive and imaginary constructions of anarchists. Many anarchists find themselves compulsively responding to negative characterizations of our intentions and dispositions. In the face of an array of flattering accusations—we are criminal, nihilistic, violent, sowers of disorder—the proponents of a positive anarchism instinctively respond by insisting that we are motivated by the highest ideals (democracy, consensus, equality, justice), seek to create a better society, are non-violent, and believe anarchism to be the greatest order of all. Over and over again anarchists and other revolutionaries offer their allegiance to society by denying the reality or possibility of their enmity with the social order. Leftist notions of reform, progress, tolerance, and social justice always come up against the harsh reality that any progressive development can only mean a more sophisticated system of misery and exploitation; that tolerance means nothing; that justice is an impossibility. Activists, progressive and revolutionary alike, will always respond to our critique of the social order with a demand that we articulate some sort of alternative. Let us say once and for all that we have none to offer. Faced with the system’s seamless integration of all positive projects into itself, we can’t afford to affirm or posit any more alternatives for it to consume. Rather we must realize that our task is infinite, not because we have so much to build but because we have an entire world to destroy. Our daily life is so saturated and structured by capital that it is impossible to imagine a life worth living, except one of revolt. We understand destruction to be necessary, and we desire it in abundance. We have nothing to gain through shame or lack of confidence in these desires. There cannot be freedom in the shadow of prisons, there cannot be human community in the context of commodities, there cannot be self-determination under the reign of a state. This world—the police and armies that defend it, the institutions that constitute it, the architecture that gives it shape, the subjectivities that populate it, the apparatuses that administer its function, the schools that inscribe its ideology, the activism that franticly responds to its crises, the arteries of its circulation and flows, the commodities that define life within it, the communication networks that proliferate it, the information technology that surveils and records it—must be annihilated in every instance, all at once. To shy away from this task, to assure our enemies of our good intentions, is the most crass dishonesty. Anarchy, as with queerness, is most powerful in its negative form. Positive conceptions of these, when they are not simply a quiet acquiescence in the face of a sophisticated and evolving totality of domination, are hopelessly trapped in combat with the details of this totality on its own terms.

## Fw

#### Interpretation – affirmative teams should have to defend hypothetical implementation of topical plan that increases prohibitions of anti-competitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of core antitrust laws.

#### 1—“Core antitrust laws” are the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts.

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At the federal level, there are three core antitrust laws: (1) the Sherman Act, in which Section 1 outlaws “every contract, combination, or conspiracy in [unreasonable] restraint of trade,” and Section 2 outlaws any “monopolization, attempted monopolization, or conspiracy or combination to monopolize”;1 (2) the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices”;2 and (3) Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers and acquisitions where the effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”3 Criminal violations of the Sherman Act carry a maximum penalty of a $100 million fine for corporations, and a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a $1 million fine for individuals. A prevailing plaintiff in a civil suit can recover treble damages and attorneys’ fees. But federal law currently does not provide for civil penalties when the government brings an antitrust case, only injunctive relief.

#### 2—“Prohibition” is a legal restriction.

Duhaime’s Law Dictionary N.D. –  Referred to by the Oxford University law library (Bodleian), School of Law, University of Oxford, Oxford, England, as a recommended research resource for law students (“Prohibition Definition”, Duhaime’s Law Dictionary, <https://www.duhaime.org/Legal-Dictionary/Term/Prohibition>, No Date)

Prohibition Definition:

A legal restriction against the use of something or against certain conduct.

#### Violation – the aff doesn’t defend the end point of increasing prohibitions that expand the scope of core antitrust laws

#### Prefer our interpretation:

#### 1---Fairness – the aff interp destroys it – not requiring a plan text decks stasis by allowing aff teams to change the 1AC throughout the debate, explodes the burden of negative research by unlimiting it to anything tangentially related to the resolution, and nullifies all topic-specific neg prep by forcing teams to rely on concessionary ground

#### 2---Truth Testing – only a topic with predictable limits produces clash-filled debates, which is the only internal link to any benefit debate can offer – rigorously testing positions allows debaters to improve their own advocacies and how to defend them, which creates more ethical and effective worldviews – but that becomes impossible without specific resolutional ties

#### The TVA is

#### Subject logistics firms to anti-trust oversight to reverse extension of value production throughout the entire logistics chain

1ac author R. Joshua Scannell (PhD student @ The Graduate Center, City University of New York) 5/2018 [“Electric Light: Automating the Carceral State During the Quantification of Everything” A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York online @ <https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3617&context=gc_etds>, loghry]

Cowen points, especially, to the effort to deregulate railroads as the “lynchpin in the construction of the global material infrastructure for business logistics” (Cowen 2014, 45). Part and parcel of the longer history of “containerization” in the logistics world, Cowen notes that American regulatory bodies established under late-19th century antitrust mandates, like the Interstate Commerce Commission, prevented the emergence of fully integrated logistics networks. Prior to the passage of the Staggers Act in 1980, groups like the ICC prevented transportation companies from owning various “modes” of logistics infrastructure (like both rail and shipping), and had final oversight over companies’ decisions to ship more than one type of cargo per load, or change rates. After deregulation, these barriers fell, and the race was on to expand ownership across different arterial infrastructures of commodity circulation in pursuit of “seamlessness.” Without anti-trust oversight, logistics firms consolidated and relentlessly pursued containerization – a logistics process that rendered the overwhelming majority of longshoremen redundant, thereby eliminating the greatest impediment to “efficient” transport of goods across different modal seams: labor. In the wake, logistics companies could further standardize, streamline, and automate the work required to move stuff across a series of different logistics terrains. Intermodal standardization, and the accompanying fantasy of “seamless” circulation, reorganized the sites at which shrinkage and loss occurred. In effect, as Cowan points out, deregulation and standardization extended the site of value production out form the factory and into the entire network of transporting goods. Impediments to smooth transit now tallied as value lost across an enormous arterial infrastructure, which in turn demanded an increasingly granular attention paid to the movements of all goods across all terrains from the point of assembly at one or different factories to the point of sale to the consumer (Ibid.). Bar codes met this demand, and generated an effluence of data that were used to train algorithms to mine the interior lives of machines.

#### Framework has to be a voting issue – integrity of the game is a precondition for voting, and we’ve all implicitly agreed fairness is good by abiding by other norms like speech times and order – not voting for fairness causes judge biases which are worse

## Affirmation pic

#### Savana and I interogate productivity without productivity within a new rubric of time that operates not within a western notion of linear time but instead a crip time that cultivates new relationships to temporality that decenters the desire for futurity and new compositions and instead de-composition as political project.

#### Don’t “affirm” productivity without productivity within an understanding of crip time, interrogate it---the choice of affirmation prefigures ethical orientation, closes off the possibility of revision and contingency and suppresses difference

Connolly 98 – William E., Endowed Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, “Rethinking The Ethos of Pluralization”, Philosophy & Social Criticism, January, p. 97-98

I endorse what White says about the responsibility to listen to the utterances of others, particularly as those utterances occur within the politics of becoming. It may be important to add, however, that the identities of embodied human beings are involved here. The cultural organization of feeling and disposition is intimately entangled with utterances while not being entirely reducible to them. To work on an embodied feeling of disgust, for example, as it has become entrenched in the cortical organization of the stomach itself, is to modify a cultural organization of feeling scripted into the intelligence of the body. To change that corporeal script is to open up room for revised utterances. This is indeed where Nietzschean and Foucauldian experimental tactics by the self on the self are applied and where Deleuzian micropolitics does much of its work. These ethical practices are crucial to critical responsiveness because they are applied to the cultural coding of feelings and dispositions that resist the politics of becoming. Such tactics are experimental in that they work below and inside discourse in ways that open up new possibilities for it. You experiment, say, on a culturally encrypted feeling of disgust over a sensuality that disturbs your sexual identity or a nationality that unsettles you, doing so to move that visceral element inside thinking itself in another direction. Examples of such tactics are offered in Chapter 2. So far, then, White and I are on the same wavelength. But I am not sure I concur entirely that an ontopolitical stance must ’prefigure’ the ethic or ethos one endorses. At any rate, the ontopolitical stance advanced here does not exactly prefigure the ethic cultivated. Rather, it enables it as a possibility and disarms certain kinds of objections and resistances to pursuit of that possibility. One might, for instance, adopt a Nietzschean/Deleuzian conception of being and then respond with a politics that suppresses difference. Carl Schmitt may embody that combination. The response you fashion to the basic condition projected depends above all upon the temper or sensibility you cultivate with respect to it. The word ’affirm’ thus bears a lot of weight in an ethic drawing part of its sustenance from Nietzsche and Foucault. An ethic of critical responsiveness to the politics of becoming may be inspired by the thinking and example of others, but that inspiration, to take, must first tap into preliminary strains of responsiveness already there and then those so moved must take steps to develop those strains of responsiveness further. The element of contingency and fragility thus never disappears from ethics. For the strains of responsiveness may not be there; or the project may not be undertaken; or it may fail, even if undertaken; or it may succeed for a while and then collapse. That is part of the tragic element in ethics. And that is also why micropolitics and arts of the self play a prominent role in the type of ethic I endorse. You work on, let us say, the infrasensible organization of the self and the other to cultivate reciprocal generosity and responsiveness; you work to ’affirm’ the ’rich ambiguity of existence’ in a way that nourishes receptive generosity.

# On

## Case case

### Presumption

#### Presumption:

#### 1 --- they haven’t met their burden of proof. The 1AC already introduced their academic perspective, the ballot cannot actualize that theory.

#### 2---Debatability---they provide no concrete or new strategy that hasn’t already been done---that makes them undebatable because we can never predict what the 2AC spin will be---vote neg on presumption

### James

#### The aff has already been controlled for by neoliberalism – their utopia is what keeps the free functioning of the neoliberal economy going

James 14 [Robin. Robin James is Associate Professor of Philosophy at UNC Charlotte. “From “No Future” to “Delete Yourself (You Have No Chance to Win)”: Death, Queerness, and the Sound of Neoliberalism,” Journal of Popular Music Studies, Volume 25, Issue 4. SH]

The queer repetition, looping, and electric buzzing that, in classically liberal regimes, were illegible to hegemony, and thus opposites or alternatives to it, are, by the 1990s, registered as deviances that are always already controlled for. Specifically, they’re preprogrammed right into MIDI interfaces, VSTs, sequencers, samplers, and all sorts of other electronic music media. MIDIs (and other electronic instruments) give easy access to biopolitical death, in the form of both (i) the black/queer critical strategies of repetition, looping, and electronic buzzing, and (ii) the ability to use those strategies in ways that mimic biopolitical death.38 They give us access to intensities that are excessively high or excessively low, to what is illegible and imperceptible to neoliberal hegemony, and thus to what might appear to undermine hegemony’s attempts to manage it. However, as “MIDIjunkies” warns, this is only a faux subversion: it fucks you up, not hegemony. As Deleuze and Guattari argue in A Thousand Plateaus, drugs can induce a sort of faux subversion of neoliberal logics of intensity (in Deleuze’s terms, “control society”). According to them, getting fucked up on drugs mimics the experience of radical critique—what they call “deterritorialization.” Drugs “change perception,” altering its speed and intensity, and can thus reorganize epistemic and perceptual frameworks (Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus 282), making perceptible what was, in hegemonic regimes, imperceptible. Psychedelics do this, amphetamines do this, even alcohol and caffeine do this. However, Deleuze and Guattari argue that in drug use, “the deterritorializations remain relative” (Plateaus 285) because highs are finite and everybody comes down sometimes. Human physiology and drug chemistry are hard limits; drug use happens in “the context of relative thresholds that restrict” drug use to the “imitation” of deterritorialization (Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus 284). Drug addiction even further restricts the possibilities opened up by drug use: addicts go “down, instead of high . . . the causal line, creative line, or line of flight” opened by drug use “turns into a line of death and abolition” (Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus 285). In other words, drugs fuck up junkies, not hegemony; the trick is that hegemony convinces these “junkies” that their dejection is actually transgressive, even though it is carefully accounted for and managed. Junkies deviate in ways that are already standardized and accounted for. These losers fail in hegemony’s terms: as in a video game, losers might have shitty profiles full of losses and deficient in wins, but they still have a profile that the system tracks. “MIDIjunkies” treats MIDIs as drugs in the Deleuzoguattarian sense. MIDIs can be used in ways that make artists feel like they’re fucking shit up, subverting hegemony’s arche, but they do so in very carefully controlled and limited ways. One might think these electronic tools allow us to intensify repetition and noisiness beyond the limits of human perception or kinesthetic capacity. However, all hardware and software have limits: knobs only go up to 10, so to speak (and however you measure it, potentiometers do have mechanical and electrical limits). In Deleuzoguattarian terms, MIDIs make planes of consistency within a plane of organization (i.e., the technological and mechanical limits of the MIDI program, the potentiometers on the control devices, etc.). The most prominent example of this is the song’s use of apparently unmetered sound. To the casual listener, the last part of the song—about four minutes in, after the bass drops out and all that’s left are various treble synths—might appear to abandon the song’s solid 4/4 and veer off into nonmetric noodling (the same noodling, notably, that begins “Delete Yourself”). There is no regular bass or percussion pattern to follow, so casual listeners could easily loose the downbeat. This section seems to exemplify what Deleuze and Guattari call, “a liberation of time, Aion, a nonpulsed time for a floating music, as Boulez says, an electronic music in which forms give way to pure modifications of speed” (Plateaus 267, my emphasis). But these sections are not unmetered. The noodling still falls into four-bar phrases: every four bars, the musical motive changes slightly. The song itself is only superficially nonmetric. Moreover, most listeners were not casual—they were fervently dancing, pogoing up and down to the beat and keeping meter with their bodies (in lieu of the bass and percussion tracks doing it for them).39 This apparent foray into the nonmetric shows that what appears as unregulated improvisation is in fact possible only because of a very tightly managed foundation. Similar approaches are found in African American music. For example, in the Moonwalker (1988) version of Michael Jackson’s “Smooth Criminal,” there is a vocal breakdown that, to the casual listener, is composed of aleatory, nonmetric groans and moans. As the video’s staging shows, Jackson is in control throughout, carefully orchestrating what looks like unmanaged chaos (e.g., he keeps time by snapping his fingers or moving his body). As the music in “MIDIjunkies” shows, this apparent transgression of metric arche isn’t, in fact, a transgression. Drug-induced excesses are, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, ultimately faux deterritorializations. I think it is important to read “MIDIjunkies” through Deleuze, Guattari, and Bogue not only because ATR had explicit connections to Deleuzian thought (e.g., Empire’s involvement with Mille Plateaux records), but also because its critique of druggy, free-floating, meterless time clarifies one of the main limitations of José Esteban Muñoz’s concept of ecstatic queer utopianism. Muñoz theorizes ecstatic utopianism through both queer/punk performance and through comparisons to MDMA, once commonly referred to as ecstasy (“molly” is the preferred street name nowadays). For Muñoz, ecstasy—literally ek-stasis, excessive, ornamental, nonfunctional pleasure that transgresses the limitations of straight time and commodity capitalism— is both a critique of and alternative to Edelmanian negativity. Instead of the negation or rejection of the future, ecstasy is, as Muñoz explains via Marcuse (1974), “the liberation from time” (133), and specifically from the linear progressive rationality of “straight” capitalist time (as represented, for example, by Marcuse’s concept of the performance principle).40 Queer ecstasy is an excessiveness that works, like a drug, as “a surplus that pushes one off course, no longer able to contribute labor power at the proper tempo” (Muñoz 154). However, what both Deleuze and Guattari and “MIDIjunkies” demonstrate is that this druggy, irregular temporality is, in neoliberalism, decidedly not queer—it is the very measure of healthy deregulated economy (of capital, of desire) in which rigidly controlled background conditions generate increasingly eccentric foreground events. This deterritorialization is only relative; not even time is liberated because in neoliberalism, labor power is supposed to be offbeat and irregular.41 The real junkies here are the ones addicted to classically liberal concepts of death and resistance as negation—the ones who think “flowers in the dustbin” are actually oppositional, and not the compost fueling neoliberal biopower. Nonmetrical music is an-archic, and like the Pistols, treats death or negation in a classically liberal framework. Because neoliberalism always already co-opts death, randomness, and an-arche, these strategies do not challenge biopolitical hegemonies. Neoliberal regimes use biopolitical administration to regularize death; a normalized variable, death is not a form of distortion. The task, then, is to distort death. This is what happens on “Into the Death,” which hyper-intensifies biopolitical or metric regulation.

### Ballot

#### Ballot – The 1AC’s value stands on its own---responding to it with judgement and the ballot is a hollow validation that siphons off political energy and draws them into the oppressive gaze of the academy---vote Negative to decline affirmation

Phillips 99 – Dr. Kendall R. Phillips, Professor of Communication at Central Missouri State University, PhD in Speech Communication from Pennsylvania State University, MA in Speech Communication from Central Missouri State University, BS in Psychology and Sociology from Southwest Baptist University, “Rhetoric, Resistance, and Criticism: A Response to Sloop and Ono”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Volume 32, Number 1, p. 96-101

My concern with this movement centers around an issue that Sloop and Ono seem to take as a given, namely, the role of the critic. On one hand, calling for the systematic investigation of existing marginalized discourses is a natural extension both of critical rhetoric (see McKerrow 1989, 1991) and of the general ideological turn in criticism (see Wander 1983). On the other hand, the ease of transition from criticism in the service of resistance to criticism of resistance may obscure the need to address some fundamental issues regarding the general function of rhetorical criticism in an uncertain and contentious world. Beyond licensing the critic to engage in political struggle, Sloop and Ono advocate the pursuit of covert resistant discourses. Such a move not only stretches our understanding of rhetoric and criticism, but also alters significantly the relationship between critic and out- law. Critical interrogation of dominant discursive practices in the service of political/cultural reform is supplanted in favor of positioning covert out- law communities as objects of investigation. Invited to seek out subversive discourses, the critic is positioned as the active agent of change and the out-law discourse becomes merely instrumental. Rather than academic criticism acting in service of everyday acts of resistance, everyday acts of resistance are put into the service of academic criticism. Rhetorical resistance That we are "caught within conflicting logics of justice that are culturally struggled over" (Sloop and Ono 1997, 50) and that rhetoric is employed in these struggles seems an uncontroversial statement. Despite the theoretical miasma surrounding judgment, Sloop and Ono accurately note, the material process of rendering judgments (and of disputing the logics of litigation) continues in the world of actually practiced discourse. In the materially contested world, rhetoric is utilized both by those seeking to secure the grounds of dominant judgment and by those seeking to undermine or supplant dominant cultural logics with some out-law notion of justice. The distinction between these two cultural groups, "in-law" and out- law, however, deserves some consideration prior to any discussion of the role of the critic as implied in the out-law discourse project. The discourse of the dominant or those within the bounds of superordinate logics of litigation is reminiscent of Michel De Certeau's (1984) strategic discourse. For De Certeau, strategies are utilized by those who have authority by virtue of their proper position. Strategies exploit the institutionally guaranteed background consensus by which power relations (and litigations) are maintained and advanced. In contrast, tactics are utilized by those having no proper place of authority within the discursive economy who must seek opportunities whereby the discourse of the dominant might be undermined and contested. To extend Sloop and Ono's definition, out-law discourses are those that can (and, by their analysis, do) take advantage of situations (e.g., race riots) to disrupt the regularity of dominant cultural groups. The ongoing struggle between strategically instituted cultural dominants and the "out-law always lurk[ing] in the distance" (66) is acknowledged, even celebrated, by Sloop and Ono. What their acknowledgment fails to provide, however, is a clear need for critical intervention. Indeed, quite the reverse is presented: It is the critic (particularly the left-leaning critic) who needs out-law discourse. While the struggles over justice, equality, and freedom have gone on, the left-leaning critics are those who have theoretically excluded themselves from the disputes. The study of out-law dis- courses, then, provides a means to reinvigorate the intellectual and re-institute (academic) leftist thinking into popular political struggles (53-54). Thus, Sloop and Ono's project incorporates three types of rhetoric: the rhetoric of the in-law, presumably the traditional object of critical attention; the rhetoric of the out-law, the study of which may transform our understanding of judgment as well as reinvigorate leftist democratic critiques; and the rhetoric of the critics who, having lost their political po- tency, can exploit the discourse of the out-law to promote ideological struggles. It is to this critical rhetoric that I now turn. Resistance criticism Sloop and Ono (1997) clearly state the relationship they envision between the rhetorical critic and out-law discourse: "Ultimately, we will argue that the role of critical rhetoricians is to produce 'materialist conceptions of judgment,' using out-law judgments to disrupt dominant logics of judgment" (54; emphasis added). Here the critic seeks out vernacular discourse (60), focuses on the methods and values embodied in these communities (62), listens to and evaluates the out-law community (62-63), and chooses appropriate discourses for the purpose of disrupting dominant practices (63). Essentially, it is the critic who seeks out marginalized discourses and returns them to the center for the purpose of provoking dominant cultural groups (63). Despite acknowledging the efficacy of out-law discourses, Sloop and Ono assume that the critiques generated and presented by the out-law community have only minimal effect. The irony, and indeed arrogance, of this assumption is evident when they claim: "There are cases, however, when, without the prompting of academic critics, out-law discourses serve local purposes at times and at others resonate within dominant discourses, disrupting sedimented ways of thinking, transforming dominant forms of judgment" (60; emphasis added). Sloop and Ono seem to suggest that such locally generated critiques are the exception, whereas the political efficacy of the academic critic is the rule. This seems an odd claim, given that the justification for their out-law discourse project is the lack of politically viable academic critique and the perceived potency of out-law conceptions of judgment. Their suggestion that out-law communities are in need of the academic critic contradicts not only the already disruptive nature of existing out-law discourses (the grounds for using out-law discourse), but also the impotence of contemporary critical discourse (the warrant for studying out-law discourse). By this I do not mean that the critiques and theories generated by academically instituted intellectuals have not been incorporated into subversive discourses. Just as out-law discourses inevitably mount critiques of dominant logics, so, too, the perspectives on rhetoric and criticism generated by academics are used in resistance movements. Feminist critiques of patriarchy, queer theories of homophobia, postcolonial interrogations of race have found their way into the service of resistant groups. The key distinction I wish to make is that the existence of criticism (academic or self-generated) in resistance does not necessitate Sloop and Ono's move to a criticism of resistance. What Sloop and Ono fail to offer is an adequate argument for "taking public speaking out of the streets and studying it in the classroom, for treating it less as an expression of protest" (Wander 1983, 3) and more as an object for analysis and reproduction within the political economy of the academy. Philip Wander made a similar charge against Herbert Wicheln's early critical project, and this concern should remain at the forefront of any discussion aimed at expanding the scope and function of criticism. Sloop and Ono offer numerous directives for the critic without addressing whether the critic should be examining out-law discourses in the first place. While it is too early to suggest any definitive answer to the question of criticism of resistance, some preliminary arguments as to why critics should not pursue out-law discourses can be offered: (1) Hidden out-law discourses may have good reasons to stay hidden. Sloop and Ono specifically instruct us that "the logic of the out-law must constantly be searched for, brought forth" (66) and used to disrupt dominant practices. But are we to believe that all out-law discourses are prepared to mount such a challenge to the dominant cultural logic? Or, indeed, that the members of out-law communities are prepared to be brought into the arena of public surveillance in the service of reconstituting logics of litigation? It seems highly unlikely that all divergent cultural groups have developed equally, or that all members of these groups share Sloop and Ono's "imperial impulse" (51) to promote their conceptions and practices of justice. (2) Academic critical discourse is not transparent. Here I allude to the overall problem of translation (see Foucault 1994; Lyotard 1988; Lyotard and Thebaud 1985; Zabus 1995) as an extension of the previous concern. Critical discourse cannot become the medium of commensurability for divergent language games. Are we to believe that the "use" of out-law dis- course by critics to disrupt dominant practices can fail to do violence to these diverse/divergent logics? Are out-law discourses merely tools to be exploited and discarded in the pursuit of returning leftist academic dis- course to the center? (3) Perhaps the academic translation of out-law discourse could be true to the internal logic of the out-law community. And, perhaps the re-presentation of out-law logic within the academic community will bestow a degree of legitimacy on the out-law community. Nonetheless, the effect of legitimizing out-law discourse is unknown and potentially destructive. In an effort to siphon the political energy of out-law discourse into academic practice, we may ultimately destroy the dissatisfaction that serves as a cathexis for these out-law discourses. It seems possible that academic recognition might take the place of struggle for material opportunities (see Fraser 1997). But, will academic legitimation create any material changes in the conditions of out-law communities? I mean to suggest, not that it is better to allow the out-law community to suffer for its cause, but rather that incorporating the struggle into an (admittedly) impotent academic critique does not offer a prima facie alternative. (4) Criticism of resistance denies the practical and theoretical importance of opportunity. Returning to De Certeau's notion of tactics, the crucial element of these discursive moves is their use of opportunity to disrupt the proper authority of the dominant. The kairos of intervention provides the key to undermining "in-law" discourses. But when is the "right moment in time" for the academic reproduction of out-law discourse? Mapping the points of resistance (ala Foucault and Biesecker) entails interrogating "in-law" discourses for their incongruities and contradictions, not turning the academic gaze upon those communities waiting for an opportunity. Out-laws do not lurk in the forefront (66), hoping to be exposed by academic critics; they wait for the right moment for their disruption. Rhetoricians can provide rhetorical instructions for seeking opportunities and for exploiting these opportunities (literally making the culturally weaker argument the stronger), but this does not justify interrogating (intervening in) the cultural logics of the marginalized. The concerns raised here are not designed to dismiss Sloop and Ono's provocative essay. The divergent critical logic they outline deserves careful consideration within the critical community, and it is my hope that the concerns I raise may help to further problematize the relationship between resistance and rhetorical criticism. Rhetorical criticism As I have suggested, my purpose is to use the provocative nature of Sloop and Ono's project to extend disputes regarding the ends of rhetorical criticism. Diverging perspectives on the ends of criticism have been categorized by Barbara Warnick (1992) as falling along four general lines: artist, analyst, audience, and advocate. Leah Ceccarelli (1997) discerns similar categories around the aesthetic, epistemic, and political ends of rhetorical criticism. The out-law discourse project presents clear ties to the notion of critic as advocate. For Sloop and Ono, the critic is an interested party, discerning (and at times disputing) the underlying values and forces contained within a discourse. Additionally, however, the out-law discourse critic is an analyst focusing on the hidden, aberrant texts of the out-law and "rendering] an incoherent or esoteric text comprehensible" (Warnick 1992, 233). Now, I am not suggesting that a critic must serve only one function or that the roles of advocate and analyst are mutually exclusive; rather, these entanglings of power (political ends) and knowledge (epistemic ends) are inevitable. My concern is that we not neglect the complexity of these entanglements. Turning covert out-law discourses into objects of our analyses runs the risk of subjecting them both to the gaze of the dominant and to the power relations of the academy. As the works of Michel Foucault (especially 1979, 1980) aptly illustrate, practices presented as extending such noble goals as emancipation and humanity may endow institutions of confinement and objectification. Any justification for studying out-law dis- course because doing so may extend our political usefulness in the pursuit of emancipatory goals must not obscure the already existing power relations authorizing such studies. Our attempts to extend our domains of knowledge and expertise (authority) must not be pursued unreflexively.

#### The university, including debate, is only a sight of social death---that turns case.

**Occupied UC Berkeley 09** ~"The Necrosocial: Civic Life, Social Death, and the UC.

**Yes, very much a cemetery. Only here there are no dirges, no prayers, only the repeated testing of our threshold for anxiety, humiliation, and debt. The classroom just like the workplace just like the university just like the state just like the economy manages our social death, translating what we once knew from high school, from work, from our family life into academic parlance, into acceptable forms of social conflict.** Who knew that behind so much civic life (electoral campaigns, student body representatives, bureaucratic administrators, public relations officials, Peace and Conflict Studies, ad nauseam) was so much social death? What postures we maintain to claim representation, what limits we assume, what desires we dismiss? And in this moment of crisis they ask us to twist ourselves in a way that they can hear. Petitions to Sacramento, phone calls to Congressmen—even the chancellor patronizingly congratulates our September 24th student strike, shaping the meaning and the force of the movement as a movement against the policies of Sacramento. He expands his institutional authority to encompass the movement. When students begin to hold libraries over night, beginning to take our first baby step as an autonomous movement he reins us in by serendipitously announcing library money. He manages movement, he kills movement by funneling it into the electoral process. He manages our social death. He looks forward to these battles on his terrain, to eulogize a proposition, to win this or that—he and his look forward to exhausting us. He and his look forward to a reproduction of the logic of representative governance, the release valve of the university plunges us into an abyss where ideas are wisps of ether—that is, meaning is ripped from action. Let’s talk about the fight endlessly, but always only in their managed form: to perpetually deliberate, the endless fleshing-out-of—when we push the boundaries of this form they are quick to reconfigure themselves to contain us: the chancellor’s congratulations, the reopening of the libraries, the managed general assembly—there is no fight against the administration here, only its own extension. Each day passes in this way, the administration on the look out to shape student discourse—it happens without pause, we don’t notice nor do we care to. It becomes banal, thoughtless. So much so that we see we are accumulating days: one semester, two, how close to being this or that, how far? This accumulation is our shared history. This accumulation—every once in a while interrupted, violated by a riot, a wild protest, unforgettable fucking, the overwhelming joy of love, life shattering heartbreak—is a muted, but desirous life. A dead but restless and desirous life. **The university steals and homogenizes our time yes, our bank accounts also, but it also steals and homogenizes meaning. As much as capital is invested in building a killing apparatus abroad, an incarceration apparatus in California, it is equally invested here in an apparatus for managing social death. Social death is, of course, simply the power source, the generator, of civic life with its talk of reform, responsibility, unity. A ‘life,’ then, which serves merely as the public relations mechanism for death: its garrulous slogans of freedom and democracy designed to obscure the shit and decay in which our feet are planted. Yes, the university is a graveyard, but it is also a factory: a factory of meaning which produces civic life and at the same time produces social death.** A factory which produces the illusion that meaning and reality can be separated; which everywhere reproduces the empty reactionary behavior of students based on the values of life (identity), liberty (electoral politics), and happiness (private property). Everywhere the same whimsical ideas of the future. Everywhere democracy. Everywhere discourse to shape our desires and distress in a way acceptable to the electoral state, discourse designed to make our very moments here together into a set of legible and fruitless demands. Totally managed death. A machine for administering death, for the proliferation of technologies of death. As elsewhere, things rule. Dead objects rule. In this sense, it matters little what face one puts on the university—whether Yudof or some other lackey. These are merely the personifications of the rule of the dead, the pools of investments, the buildings, the flows of materials into and out of the physical space of the university—each one the product of some exploitation—which seek to absorb more of our work, more tuition, more energy. The university is a machine which wants to grow, to accumulate, to expand, to absorb more and more of the living into its peculiar and perverse machinery: high-tech research centers, new stadiums and office complexes. And at this critical juncture the only way it can continue to grow is by more intense exploitation, higher tuition, austerity measures for the departments that fail to pass the test of ‘relevancy.’ But the ‘irrelevant’ departments also have their place. With their ‘pure’ motives of knowledge for its own sake, they perpetuate the blind inertia of meaning ostensibly detached from its social context. As the university cultivates its cozy relationship with capital, war and power, these discourses and research programs play their own role, co-opting and containing radical potential. And so we attend lecture after lecture about how ‘discourse’ produces ‘subjects,’ ignoring the most obvious fact that we ourselves are produced by this discourse about discourse which leaves us believing that it is only words which matter, words about words which matter. The university gladly permits the precautionary lectures on biopower; on the production of race and gender; on the reification and the fetishization of commodities. A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us against any confrontational radicalism. And all the while power weaves the invisible nets which contain and neutralize all thought and action, that bind revolution inside books, lecture halls. There is no need to speak truth to power when power already speaks the truth. The university is a graveyard– así es. The graveyard of liberal good intentions, of meritocracy, opportunity, equality, democracy. Here the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. **We graft our flesh, our labor, our debt to the skeletons of this or that social cliché. In seminars and lectures and essays, we pay tribute to the university’s ghosts, the ghosts of all those it has excluded—the immiserated, the incarcerated, the just-plain-fucked. They are summoned forth and banished by a few well-meaning phrases and research programs, given their book titles, their citations. This is our gothic—we are so morbidly aware, we are so practiced at stomaching horror that the horror is thoughtless.**

### Case

#### Crip theory creates a monolithic disabled identity that erases nuanced lived experiences – prefer the aff’s policy engagement over their dearth of action that fails to operationalize theory

Bone, 2017 (Kirstin Marie, Department of English, University of Alabama, “Trapped behind the glass: crip theory and disability Identity”, *Disability and Society*, Latest Articles, Published Online 4/21/2017)//aaron leonard kall

Both of these theories critique the socially constructed nature of disability. However, they suffer from similar failings of being what Mike Oliver calls ‘chatter’ that ‘is proving disastrous for many disabled people whose benefits and services are being severely cut back or removed altogether’ (2013, 1025). Crip theory and the social model of disability are built on ideologies that have not yet created actual change in the lives of disabled people. This ‘overemphasis on cultural construction rather than political marginalization’ can lead to the disabled ‘feeling powerless in the face of cultural hegemony’ and suffers from a marked lack of ‘engagement with disability activism’ (Goodley 2011, 18). These modes of thought are echo chambers wherein the boundaries working against the disabled are outlined, but there is a dearth of action to actively change laws and re-envision disabled lives as being worth living. Additionally, there is the question of hierarchy in how certain disabilities are privileged over others in both of these discourses. Similarly, the social model mimics tensions within the disability community where those with ‘learning difficulties’ and other less visible disabilities are seen as lesser. Simone Aspis explains: People with ‘learning difficulties’ face discrimination in the disability movement. People without ‘learning difficulties’ use the medical model when dealing with us. We are always asked to talk about advocacy and our impairments as though our barriers aren’t disabling in the same way as disabled people without ‘learning difficulties.’ We want concentration on our access needs in the mainstream disability movement. (As quoted in Campbell and Oliver 1996, 97) Unlike a paraplegic, a less visibly disabled person might face disablism/ableism from within the community. Dan Goodley (2001, 217–218) points out how members of both communities will seek to disidentify with one another in order to not be perceived ‘as handicapped.’ Crip theory does not dismantle these tensions. If anything, crip theory carries with it the embodied history and a preference for the visibly disabled body, particularly in McRuer’s reliance on crippled narratives like those of Sandahl and Sharon Kowalski (McRuer 2006, 50–53 and 84–86). Through the selection of these particular case studies, McRuer established crip theory as belonging to a very limited portion of disabled bodies. Margaret Price (2008) first pointed out the potential for this pitfall: ‘Which bodies will be privileged, which marginalized’ within the discourse of ‘queercrip studies’? Similarly, Lotta LöfgrenMårtenson acknowledges that ‘McRuer does not make any reference to intellectual disabilities in his writing’ and ‘instead, the theory proceeds from people with physical disabilities’ (2013, 420). Instead of fulfilling Kafer’s hopes that ‘crip’ would overcome its embodied connotations, crip theory reinforces them both through the rhetoric of the word ‘crip’ and foundational theorists’ privileging of certain bodies over others. Scholars such as Simo Vehmas and Nick Watson (2014) view McRuer’s crip theory as a subset of critical disability studies. Mairian Hill Scott (nee Corker) sought to engage with the ‘terms used to define disability and impairment’ in order ‘to contest meanings’ and break ‘down binary opposites’ (Vehmas and Watson 2014, 639). These ideas became the foundation for critical disability studies, which personalized the disabled experience by basing it in the rhetoric of individual impairment and the social difficulties it then created. Unlike the social model, Hill Scott called for ‘the development of a social space where identities could be formed and fashioned free from the normative constraints imposed by bipolar norms of disabled/non-disabled’ (Vehmas and Watson 2014, 639). Thus, critical disability studies would bridge the divide between impairment and disability by displacing the conversation away from the materialistic concerns of the previous modes of thought. Crip theory follows this framework by seeking to unsettle key perceptions of ability and what defines the normate. Besides McRuer’s compulsory able-bodied/disabled binary, there are other examples of how this challenge moves throughout crip theory. Carrie Sandahl examines ‘crip, queer, solo autobiographical performers’ in order to uncover places of tension both within the normate construct and also ‘the clash between crip and queer identities’ (2003, 27). Her examination of the disabled performance as a site of sexuality and injustice ‘suggests potentials for theoretical and activist intervention on the stage, in the academy, and in everyday life’ (2003, 28). Sandahl ultimately concludes that the ability to draw the gaze and ‘assert pride while drawing the audience’s attention to the political and social issues of being crip and queer’ permits the disabled body to be a radical agent empowered to create real change (2003, 49). Ultimately, however, these theories share a similar weakness: they create a monolithic disabled identity that ignores the nuances of lived disabled experience. This erasure is the most dangerous element of both critical disability studies and crip theory, because both can lead to misappropriation and the silencing of disabled voices. McRuer’s claim that ‘by disrupting the categories disabled/non-disabled, the discrimination experienced by disabled people can be challenged’ is limited in its perspective (Vehmas and Watson 2014, 640). Like other forms of critical disability studies, crip theory ‘offers no evaluative arguments on impairments or on the implications of living with an impairment’ (Vehmas and Watson 2014, 641). If anything, these realities are ignored for the complications they present. Being disabled often results in poverty, a lack of healthcare, inaccessibility to a proper education, and isolation. None of these issues are addressed in crip theory or in critical disability studies, which seek to be politically generative but ultimately fail to move beyond the sphere of the theoretical. Furthermore, the ‘anti-dualistic stance adopted by’ Critical Disability Studies (CDS) seems to be unrealized, because the constructs of ableism inherently positions ‘those faring less well as having lesser value’ (Vehmas and Watson 2014, 642). Crip theory’s adamant focus on the visibly disabled body actually serves to reify the binary of able-bodied/disabled because it creates what Catherine Prendergast and Melanie Yergeau call a ‘neuroatypical rhetorical deficit’ (as quoted in Pryal 2015, 9). The neuroatypical rhetorical deficit is born when ‘the neurotypical believe that they should speak on behalf of the neuroatypical because they are better equipped to do so’ (Pryal 2015, 9). Similarly, a non-disabled person can create a disabled rhetorical deficit by speaking in place of actual disabled voices. Some crip theorists even acknowledge this issue with how the theory is framed by comparing it with its ideological foremother, queer theory. Carrie Sandahl (2003, 27) says that ‘queer theory’s tendency to absorb and flatten internal differences, in particular to neutralize its constituents’ material and cultural differences and to elevate the concerns of gay white men above all others,’ is echoed in crip theory’s tendency to erase key elements of disability experience.

### State

#### We can advocate for state action– conceptualizing the political capacity of futurity specifically in response to climate change is critical to displacing liberal subjectivity

Hall 14 (2014, Kim, Assxociate Professor of Philosophy Appalachian State University, “No Failure: Climate Change, Radical Hope, and Queer Crip Feminist Eco-Futures,” Radical Philosophy Review, Volume 17, number 1: 203–225)

In No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive Lee Edelman proclaims that a future-oriented politics informed by a positive, hopeful conception of the future is necessarily opposed to and exclusionary of queerness. The future, according to Edelman, is “kid’s stuff,”16 that which is always anticipated in the name of the Child who “embodies the citizen as an ideal, entitled to claim full rights to its future share in the nation’s good, though always at the cost of limiting the rights ‘real’ citizens are allowed.”17 In the name of this longed-for Child of the future, specifically in order to protect and promote the freedom of the imagined Child to come, the freedom of currently existing people is curtailed.18 Edelman’s contention is that present politics is oriented toward the good of the Child (or future generations) and that this future orientation of the political is the means by which heteronormative society defines and understands itself as good. In the context of this “reproductive futurity,” that which is queer can have no place because queerness disrupts efforts to secure the stability and longevity of the heteronormative family and society’s continuing existenceand identity in the figure of the Child. It is this desire for stability and preservation of “the same” in the future that Edelman rightly identifies as antithetical to the instability reflected in queer’s emphasis on becoming rather than being or fixed identity. Edelman defines queerness as that which “can never define an identity; it can only ever disturb one.”19 Thus defined, queerness defies the notion that it is possible or even good to reproduce oneself and one’s society, that the future is a site for the reproduction of the present. As Edelman points out, the effect of invoking the Child in political discourse offers assurance that society as it is currently structured will continue to exist in perpetuity. This “insistence on sameness” is, Edelman points out, central to heteronormative (and I would add able-bodyminded) conceptions of the future.20 Following Edelman’s argument, queer theory must, in order to maintain its radical edge, reject the future, a concept inextricably caught up in a reproductive logic. In its refusal of identity, queerness cannot be assimilated into the heteronormative reproductive futurity that is central to the continuance of the identity of the social order into the future.21 Queer, in other words, names that which negates the future.22 Queerness refuses the “promise of futurity,” the promise of a future that will both resemble and be better than the present.23 The future, Edelman proclaims, has and is no place for queers. Edelman’s thinking on this topic can be extended to thinking about disability and the future. After all, while normalizing stories proclaim that things will “get better,”24 that the future will be brighter, there are no queers or crips in that brighter, better future; dominant conceptions of the future posit the future as a promise only for the able-bodied, hetero- and homonormative.25 As Alison Kafer explains, a compulsorily able-bodied society perceives disabled people as having no future and the future as devoid of disability. She writes, “If disability is conceptualized as a terrible unending tragedy, then any future that includes disability can only be a future to avoid. . . . In this framework, a future with disability is a future no one wants, and the figure of the disabled person, especially the disabled fetus or child, becomes the symbol of the undesired future.”26Edelman recommends a queer politics of resistance and refusal of all forms of “enslavement in the name of having a life,”27 and his association of queerness with a rejection and refusal of the future has become very influential in queer studies. However, some queer theorists28 have argued that Edelman’s universalizing concept of the Child is a concept that ignores the racialized, classed, gendered, and able-bodied networks that work to eliminate the future for poor people, people of color, and able-bodied people in the world. To be construed as having a life not worth living (i.e., as having a life unworthy of being continued into the future) means that one is not taken into account when plans for the future are made. For example, as Michael Berubé and Nancy Tuana contend, whether or not one survived Hurricane Katrina was not simply the result of living below or above sea level; it was also about being taken into account in the city’s planning for the future, being thought of as someone to consider in light of possible disasters.29 While critical of ableist conceptions of the future and sympathetic to Edelman’s rejection of the future as irredeemably heteronormative, Kafer disagrees with Edelman’s conclusion that queerness is necessarily a position against the future. Kafer rejects Edelman’s universalizing notion of the Child as incompatible with a queer and crip futurity and defends a feminist queer crip conception of the future. Along with José Muñoz and Jasbir Puar, Kafer points out that only privileged children in the world have been allowed futures. Puar writes, For queer politics, the challenge is not so much to refuse a future through the repudiation of reproductive futurity, . . . but to understand how the biopolitics of regenerative capacity already demarcate racialized and sexualized statistical population aggregates as those in decay, destined for no future, based not upon whether they can or cannot reproduce children but on what capacities they can an cannot regenerate and what kinds of assemblages they compel, repel, spur, deflate.30 For Kafer, Muñoz, and Puar, it is incumbent upon queer, feminist, and/or disability theorists to reimagine, not reject, the future. Such reimaginings are queer crip feminist to the extent that they understand the future as open and reflective of boundaries demarcating identities and entities in the present. In his discussion of the future, Robert McRuer maintains the necessity of queer and crip critique of incorporations of “difference” that are part of neoliberal visions of the future.31 Like Kafer and Puar, McRuer does not argue for a wholesale repudiation of the future; in fact, the possibility of queer crip futures informs his critique of neoliberalism.32 For McRuer, while reproductive futurity is unsustainable, alternative sustainable futures are both possible and necessary. He writes, [W]e might note that a range of critiques of capital . . . figure disability as the sign of capitalism gone awry while also conjuring up a naturalized ablebodiedness that should follow either its reform (for liberals) or eradication (for Marxists and other revolutionaries). Queer and crip reworkings of Marxism might more effectively speak to each other across their shared desire to not simply straighten that which is bent, and might thereby recognize the multiple locations where transnational crip/queer alliances function as sites for imagining a necessarily disabled world—meaning an inhabitable [my emphasis], sustainable, livable world.33 McRuer calls for queer and crip futures that remain open to the “disability to come,” an openness that renders “other futures” and “other worlds” more accessible to the diversity of real bodies and counter-hegemonic, non-normative lives.34 What are the implications of such discussions of the future for understanding and grappling with the realities of climate change? I want to build on McRuer’s and Puar’s respective calls for sustainability and posthumanism and consider in more detail the meaning of queerness and disability in relation to the nonhuman natural world. Queer crip feminist responsiveness to climate change requires more than understanding that the future isn’t only kid’s stuff; it requires, as Rosi Braidotti suggests, an understanding that as naturecultural beings humans are both “embodied and embedded.”35 From this perspective, boundaries drawn between nature and culture, human and nonhuman, able-bodied and disabled, etc. are, as Nancy Tuana puts it, “viscous” and “porous,”36 and identities, while embodied and located, are changing not stable, interactively emergent not innate, and contingent and provisional not eternal. As Braidotti makes clear, an openness to the future for emergent, interactive, naturecultural beings means an openness to the possibility of “a future without us,” by which she means a future that does not merely reproduce the past, a future made possible by a reconception of subjectivity and community.37 This conception of the future better reflects the natureculturalbeings we are and provides a more promising ground for queer crip feminist responsiveness to climate change. It takes seriously the anthropogenic nature of climate change and the fact that not all humans are equally responsible for climate change-related harms. It is crucial for the future to be rethought in nonanthropocentric ways in queer, disability, and feminist studies because only such a reconceived future will enable us to realize sustainable futures. Discussions of the future must take climate change into account because the present reality of climate change and the future climate change to which past and present emissions have committed the planet, are inextricably part of the context in which we are oriented toward the future. To speak of the future without taking into account this context is to put forward an empty concept of the future. In the absence of taking into account the earth/planet with which our lives are enmeshed, the concept of the future that informs queer theory’s temporal turn remains too anthropocentric to be responsive to climate change. Similarly, in speaking about disability studies, Alison Kafer observes, “the pervasiveness of the social model” in disability studies has prevented it from grappling with the nonhuman environment/nature; as a result, she contends, transformative coalitional possibilities between disability and environmental movements remain largely untapped.38 Here, I extend Kafer’s insight to think about climate change—there is untapped potential not only for coalitions between political movements but also for rethinking the centrality of the often all-too-human subject at the heart of queer, crip, and feminist studies. Before saying more about how a reconceptualized subject and future at the heart of a queer crip feminist response to climate change, I turn to another preoccupation in contemporary queer theory that begs interrogation: thinking of queerness as failure.

## Extra

#### Antitrust education key to effectuating change ranging from policy to social and racial justice. Preclusion of that education creates apathy and decks advocacy skills and movement building, turns the aff

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IV. Antitrust in Civil Society Competition issues are also part of the general civic discourse separate from the campaign rhetoric and legislative proposals offered by politicians. This is also a significant sign that antitrust has begun to be an important source of small “p” politics that engages substantial segments of the public at large. One example is the increased number of non-technical books intended for a lay audience that deal with the role of antitrust in a healthy economy and democracy. Recent and forthcoming books dealing with these themes include Tim Wu’s “The Curse of Bigness,”109 Matt Stoller’s “Goliath,”110 Maurice Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi’s “Competition Overdose,”111 Zephyr Teachout’s “Break ‘em Up,”112 and David Dayan’s “Monopolized.”113 On the academic side, there are a plethora of government and NGO studies of competition policy on digital competition114 and new works are flourishing which explore the broader ramifications of antitrust and competition in society.115 Long form and more mass-market journalism have also taken up the mantle of exploring the role of antitrust and competition policy. Such diverse magazines as The Atlantic,116 Time, 117 New Republic,118 American Prospect,119 Rolling Stone,120 New York Times magazine,121 Variety,122 National Review, 123 Foreign Policy,124 and other policy and opinion magazines have all run recent stories or profiles of individuals involved in antitrust issues. Before the COVID-19 pandemic effectively monopolized press coverage in the United States, there were thirty-three antitrust related stories on the front page of the New York Times or the front page of its business section over a three-month period in late 2019. 125 A majority of the stories focused on tech giants such as Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Facebook.126 In addition, the New York Times also covered stories about mergers, merger policy, local issues such as the Chicago taxi market, and various smaller industries.127 This is separate from coverage during the same period of campaign issues and candidate statements relating to the field. A similar increase in coverage during this same period can be observed anecdotally in more business-oriented publications like Forbes, Barron’s, Wired, and the Wall Street Journal; general newspapers like USA Today, Washington Post, and Huffington Post; more local newspapers; as well as radio and television.128 Web pages and social media accounts on these issues have similarly proliferated on all ideological perspectives.129 Lobbying and public policy groups are growing in number and influence. Beyond the traditional trade associations and general think tanks there are now a number of active groups with antitrust as a large part of their focus. These include the Open Markets Institute, 130 American Antitrust Institute, 131 Anti-Monopoly Fund,132 Institute for Self-Reliance,133 Public Citizen,134 Public Knowledge,135 Demos, 136 and the International Center for Law and Economics.137 At the more technical legal end of the debate, antitrust is similarly flourishing as a field. One sees increased law school hiring in the field for the first time in decades. Academic institutes and centers abound with a wide variety of perspectives ranging from libertarian to enforcement oriented.138 Most major antitrust cases now feature multiple amicus briefs from legal and economic experts on both sides of an issue both in the Supreme Court or the Courts of Appeals.139 Conclusion Antitrust has always been political in nature. Antitrust law provides broad legal commands dealing with how governments and private individuals can challenge different types of market behavior. In this way, antitrust has not changed. Antitrust will never take the place of sports, the Dow Jones index, or the weather for conversation at the breakfast table, but it has become a meaningful part of the political and policy debate for candidates, the legislature, and important segments of civil society. What has changed, however, is the degree that antitrust has reentered the political arena. Once mostly the domain of technocrats, antitrust issues have been proposed and debated by Presidential candidates, political parties, legislators, pundits, journalists, lobby groups, and voters alike. There are also a flurry of serious proposals and investigations that would make significant changes to the current system if adopted. This is all to the good. Even if none of the current proposals come to fruition, the antitrust debate is part of a broader engagement with political economy issues dealing with fundamental concerns such as economic concentration, globalization, income inequality, social and racial justice, and even recently the proper response to the COVID-19 emergency. The many proposals, initiatives, and pressure groups represent at a minimum the return of antitrust as part of the progressive agenda.